JONES ACT APPLIED ON LAND TO SEAMAN ATTENDING TRAINING PROGRAM WHO SLIPPED ON ICY PARKING LOT AT FACILITY NOT OWNED OR OPERATED BY SHIP OWNER
DAWN RANNALS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DIAMOND JO CASINO, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 99-4267
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 20297; 2001 FED App. 0320P (6th Cir.)
January 26, 2001, Argued
September 12, 2001, Decided
September 12, 2001, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Toledo. No. 98-07545. David A. Katz, District Judge.
DISPOSITION: REVERSED and REMANDED.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff seaman sued defendant shipowner, alleging that the shipowner was liable under the Jones Act for injuries incurred by the seaman in a fall while attending a training program off the ship. The seaman appealed the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio which granted summary judgment to the shipowner.
OVERVIEW: The seaman worked as a deckhand on the shipowners' riverboat casino, and the seaman was injured by a fall in an icy parking lot of the facility in another state where she was attending a firefighting training program. The shipowner paid for the training, and the seaman's wages during the training, but the seaman was not required to attend the training. The appellate court held that the seaman raised genuine issues of fact concerning whether her injuries were incurred during the course of her employment, and were caused by unreasonably dangerous icy conditions of which the facility, as the shipowner's agent, should have known. The training was required for supervisory positions, and the shipowner's encouragement to attend indicated that attendance was within the scope of the seaman's employment. Further, any negligence of the facility was imputed to the shipowner, since its duty to provide a safe workplace was non-delegable. Also, the continued existence of the icy conditions during the day was sufficient to permit an inference of constructive notice. Finally, the common law preclusion of liability for a natural accumulation of ice did not apply to claims under the Jones Act.
OUTCOME: The judgment granting summary judgment to the shipowner was reversed.
