WIDOW RECOVERS ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFITS UNDER TRAVEL INSURANCE POLICY WHERE PASSENGER DIED WHILE ATTEMPTING TO RE-BOARD A SCUBA DIVING BOAT...
WIDOW RECOVERS ACCIDENTAL DEATH BENEFITS UNDER TRAVEL INSURANCE POLICY WHERE PASSENGER DIED WHILE ATTEMPTING TO RE-BOARD A SCUBA DIVING BOAT DESPITE COVERAGE CLAUSE WHICH COVERED INJURIES THAT OCCURRED WHILE THE INSURED BOARDED A COMMON CARRIER AND WHERE THE FATAL INJURY STARTED BEFORE RE-BOARDING THE VESSEL
Linda Fuller, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. Hartford Life Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 01-1132
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
281 F.3d 704; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 3479
December 10, 2001, Submitted
March 6, 2002, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff widow sued defendant insurer to recover accidental death benefits under a travel insurance policy purchased by her husband before he died. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of the widow and denied the insurer's motion for summary judgment. The district court also awarded the widow $125,000 in attorney's fees. The insurer appealed.
OVERVIEW: The widow's husband drowned while attempting to re-board the boat from which he had gone scuba diving. The insurance policy covered injuries that occurred while the insured boarded a common carrier. The district court held that the boat was a common carrier and that the husband's drowning injuries occurred while he was boarding the boat. The appeals court agreed. Arkansas, rather than Texas, law governed the claim, so a Texas common law definition of "common carrier" was irrelevant. Further, any common law definition was immaterial because the policy defined the term. Although the husband had taken water into his lungs before attempting to re-board the boat, the policy did not exclude coverage for a continuing injury that began before the insured attempted to board the common carrier. The term "directly" required a causal connection between accident and injury, but not a simultaneous temporal relationship. The policy did not require a connection between the risks associated with boarding a common carrier and the insured's accident. Finally, regarding the attorney's fees award, the district court considered appropriate factors when determining what fee would be reasonable.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
