Commericial Diver Who Spent Only Five Percent Of His Time Working Aboard Vessels And Who Did Not Regularly Spend Days Or Weeks At A Time Working, Eating, Or Sleeping Aboard Vessels Was Not A Jones Act "Seaman".
RICHARD LANDRY VERSUS SPECIALTY DIVING OF LOUISIANA, INC.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-1746 SECTION "K" (5)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17586
September 25, 2003, Decided
September 26, 2003, Filed; September 26, 2003, Entered
PRIOR HISTORY: Landry v. Specialty Diving of La., Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21483 (E.D. La., Nov. 4, 2002)
DISPOSITION: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment GRANTED.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff diver brought an admiralty suit against defendant employer to recover damages under the Jones Act and general maritime law for wrist injuries that were allegedly due to the employer's negligence. The employer moved for summary judgment on the grounds that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to the diver's alleged seaman status.
OVERVIEW: The diver claimed that he was injured while working above water from a small barge to restore a pile on a bridge. In granting summary judgment for the employer, the court held that the diver could not satisfy the second prong of the Chandris test for determining seaman status, which required the seaman's connection to a vessel to be substantial in both duration (temporal prong) and nature (functional prong). The diver did not allege a substantial connection to a vessel or an identifiable group of vessels under defendant's ownership and control. The diver worked only five percent of his time aboard vessels owned or controlled by the employer. This was not enough to satisfy the guideline that a worker who spent less than approximately 30 percent of his time in the service of a vessel in navigation should not qualify as a seaman. An exception for divers did not apply because, unlike the plaintiff in the Louisiana case establishing the exception, the diver did not regularly spend days or weeks at a time working, eating, and sleeping on vessels, thus being exposed to the same hazards as other seamen. Further, he worked only 53 percent of his time aboard any sort of vessel.
OUTCOME: The court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment.
