Summary Judgement Against Seaman Who Could Not Prove His Exposure To Chemicals Caused Cancer By Reliable Expert Opinion Was Affirmed
PATRICIA A. WILLS, individually and as personalrepresentative of the Estate of RICKY LEE WILLS, deceased, on behalf of RickyLee Wills and those persons similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERADAHESS CORP., SPENTONBUSH/RED STAR COMPANIES, INC., SHERIDAN TRANSPORTATION CORP.and HYGRADE OPERATORS INC., Defendants-Appellees.
Docket No. 02-7913
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
379 F.3d 32; 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 16510; 64 Fed. R. Evid.Serv. (Callaghan) 1153; 2004 AMC 2082
August 7, 2003, Argued
August 11, 2004, Decided
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant spouse of a deceased seaman sued appellee vessel owners and operators under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. app. ยง 688, and general maritime law, alleging that the seaman's death from cancer was caused by exposure to hazardous chemicals while working aboard appellees' vessels. The spouse appealed the order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York which granted summary judgment to appellees.
OVERVIEW: Appellees' vessels transported petroleum-based fuels, but appellees asserted that, despite the unreliable conclusions of the spouse's expert, there was no evidence that any fumes on the vessels could or did cause the seaman's cancer. The spouse argued that appellees' failure to comply with their duty to protect the seaman from exposure to toxins shifted the burden to appellees to show that such exposure could not cause the cancer. The spouse also argued that her expert established that such exposure was the likely cause of the seaman's cancer and, in any event, the seaman was entitled to maintenance and cure. The appellate court held, however, that the spouse's failure to establish causation precluded her claims. The rule shifting the causation burden did not apply since it could not be said with confidence that the seaman's cancer resulted from appellees' actions. Further, expert testimony was required to establish causation and, even with the relaxed burden of proof under the Jones Act, the theory of causation of the spouse's expert was admittedly controversial, was contrary to generally accepted theory, and was not grounded in reliable scientific methods.
OUTCOME: The order granting summary judgment to appellees was affirmed.
