Cruise Ship Law

JANE DOE, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Appellee, versusCELEBRITY CRUISES, INC., in personam, ZENITH SHIPPING CORPORATION, in personam,APOLLO SHIP CHANDLERS, INC., in personam, CELEBRITY CATERING SERVICESPARTNERSHIP, in personam, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, BARIS AYDIN, inpersonam, M/V ZENITH, her engines, boilers, tackle, etc., in rem,Defendants-Appellees.

No. 03-15321
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 26743
December 22, 2004, Decided
December 22, 2004, Filed

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff cruise line passenger sued defendant cruise line, vessel owner, and two other service providers after she was allegedly raped by a cruise crew member. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, after a verdict favoring the passenger, granted a Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) judgment to all defendants concluding it had not been proven that any single defendant was both a common carrier and the employer. The passenger appealed.

OVERVIEW: The alleged rape occurred off the ship at a port of call in a park near a disco that the crew member, as the passenger's waiter, had recommended to the passenger and her friends. The court held that: (1) it had admiralty jurisdiction; (2) the district court had clearly erred because it lacked authority to enter judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) for defendants on a ground not raised prior to the submission of the case to the jury; (3) defendants owed a non-delegable duty to protect their passengers from crew member assaults and thereby safely transport their cruise passengers; (4) thus the district court had not erred in concluding that defendants were strictly liable for crew member assaults on their passengers during the cruise; and (5) the common carrier- passenger relationship did not have a strict spatial limit and thus was not severed when the passenger and the crew member left the ship's premises. The court could not conclude that the interaction between them was outside the scope of the on-going carrier- passenger relationship. The court concluded that the sexual battery and sexual assault charges, and the jury's verdict as to those charges, were in no way inconsistent.

OUTCOME: The entry of judgment for defendants was reversed because the district court lacked authority to enter judgment as a matter of law on a new ground not raised by any party prior to submission of the case to the jury. The jury's verdict for plaintiff was reinstated and affirmed and the case was remanded to the district court to enter final judgment on the jury's verdict for plaintiff and against defendants.

Posted by Lipcon Law Firm at 5:51 PM | Permalink

JOSEPH THIBODAUX VERSUS C & G BOATS INC.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-3617 SECTION "J" (3)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25638
December 15, 2004, Decided
December 15, 2004, Filed
December 15, 2004, Entered

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant ship owner filed a motion to limit the testimony of plaintiff seaman's marine safety expert in connection with an action for negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 688.

OVERVIEW: The seaman was removing P-tank covers to inspect the water tight integrity of the void around the hold. While he was removing one of the covers, he was allegedly injured as a result of the negligence of the ship owner. The ship owner argued that the report and testimony of the seaman's expert should have been limited because: (1) he was not qualified to testify as an ergo dynamics expert; (2) his report was replete with references to OSHA and NIOSH regulations; and, (3) his opinions regarding the ship owner's duty to supervise the seaman's work were within the common understanding of lay jurors. Exercising its gatekeeping function under Fed. R. Evid. 702, the court held that, because the case was to have a non-jury trial, the danger of confusion that might have existed in a jury trial did not exist. The court would consider the report, along with all of the evidence presented at trial, in deciding the merits of the case. At trial, the court would properly limit or disregard any expert testimony that was neither helpful nor within the scope of the witness's expertise.

OUTCOME: The court denied the ship owner's motion to limit expert testimony and report without prejudice to urge any objections to specific testimony at trial.

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APRIL FASOLD, Appellant v. DELAWARE RIVER & BAY AUTHORITY

No. 03-3624
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 26709
December 6, 2004, Argued
December 21, 2004, Filed

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff, a supervisor for the food service crew on a passenger ferry, appealed from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, granting summary judgment to defendant precluding the supervisor's pursuit of her claims under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 688 et seq., and general maritime law.

OVERVIEW: The supervisor supervised the food service crew on a passenger ferry traveling between Lewes, Delaware and Cape May, New Jersey. Among her responsibilities was keeping clean the kitchen and galley area. While cleaning the walk-in refrigerator located in the ferry's galley, the supervisor injured her back moving a keg of beer stored there. The supervisor claimed that the refrigerator was "filthy" and that, in order for her to do her job, the keg had to be moved so food and debris behind it could be picked up. The supervisor alleged that defendant failed to, inter alia, provide a safe place to work, properly stow the keg, provide the proper equipment to move the keg, and provide a sufficient number of able-bodied crew. The instant court found that the record demonstrated that there had been problems in the past with women having to lift heavy objects, the unsuitability of hand trucks and the size of the crew being insufficient to handle all the work aboard the ship. While a jury might determine that the supervisor's actions contributed to her injury and apportion liability accordingly, that did not foreclose her claims.

OUTCOME: The judgment was reversed.

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GEORGE LEWIS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

No. C 04-1834 PJH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25283
December 2, 2004, Decided

OVERVIEW: The seaman alleged that he was injured while working on board a United States Navy vessel in June 2003. The seaman moved to California around February 2004. In May 2004, after the vessel set sail, the seaman filed suit in the Northern District of California, on the grounds that the PVA permitted suit in the residence of the seaman if the vessel was at sea. The Government argued that the seaman had to establish domicile, not mere residence in the district, and that he did not truly reside in the district. The court determined that, under the PVA, the seaman was required only to prove that he established "residence" in the district and not "domicile." The court also determined that the seaman established his residence in the district by his physical presence.

OUTCOME: The court denied the Government's motion to dismiss and denied as moot the Government's motion to transfer for improper venue.

Posted by Lipcon Law Firm at 5:49 PM | Permalink