A RIVERBOAT CASINO CAN BE CONSIDERED A “VESSEL IN NAVIGATION” EVEN THOUGH IT’S PRIMARILY NOT MOVING.
ANGELA L. BOOTEN and CRAIG L. WILLEFORD, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ARGOSY GAMING COMPANY, d/b/a ALTON BELLE CASINO, Defendant-Appellee.
NO. 5-04-0423
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, FIFTH DISTRICT
2006 Ill. App. LEXIS 331
April 18, 2006, Opinion Filed
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff employees filed separate cases against defendant employer, each alleging personal injury claims under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 688 (2000). In both cases, summary judgments were entered by the Circuit Court of Madison County (Illinois) in favor of the employer on the issue of the employees' seaman status under the Jones Act. The employees' separate appeals were consolidated.
OVERVIEW: The employees were injured in separate accidents while performing their respective jobs on the employer's riverboat casino. They filed separate cases under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 688 (2000). The employer was granted summary judgment in both cases on its claim that the employees were not seaman to allow their Jones Act claims. The employees' appeals were consolidated. The employees claimed that a genuine issue of material fact existed on whether the riverboat casino was a "vessel in navigation" under the Jones Act, § 688(a). The employer argued that its indefinitely moored casino could not be a vessel in navigation. The court found that the term "vessel in navigation" referred to any watercraft practically capable of maritime transportation, regardless of its primary purpose or its state of transit at a particular moment. The riverboat casino's ability to cruise was a practical possibility. It actually navigated the river approximately five times per year when it was released from its mooring to remove accumulated drift materials. Moreover, the riverboat could be ready to cruise in five to seven minutes if an emergency situation arose.
OUTCOME: The court reversed the summary judgments in both cases and remanded for further proceedings.
