THERE WAS GENUINE FACT ISSUE AS TO EMPLOYEE'S SEAMAN STATUS TO WITHSTAND SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIM UNDER 46 U.S.C.S. APP. § 688(A) (CURRENT VERSION AT 46 U.S.C.S. § 30104(A)). THERE WAS FACT ISSUE AS TO WHETHER HIS ESSENTIAL DUTIES IN SEATTLE DURING WIN
NEAL JAMES, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. WARDS COVE PACKING COMPANY, INC., Defendant - Appellee.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 29852
December 1, 2006, Filed
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant employee challenged an order from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, which dismissed on summary judgment his claims against appellee corporation under 46 U.S.C.S. app. 688(a) (current version at 46 U.S.C.S. § 30104) of the Jones Act and 33 U.S.C.S. § 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA).
OVERVIEW: The district court held that there was genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employee had a substantial connection to the corporation's fleet of vessels or whether those vessels were in navigation. On appeal, the court held that the district court improperly dismissed the Jones Act claims because the employee presented sufficient evidence to raise a factual issue as to whether his essential duties were the same in Seattle during the winter 2002-2003 season and in Alaska during his employment with the corporation prior to that winter season. In both places, the employee performed maintenance and repair work on the corporation's vessels, and he presented evidence that he spent over half his time aboard those vessels in both Alaska and Seattle. Thus, there was a genuine issue of act as to his seaman status. There also was a factual issue as to whether he worked "at sea" in the service of the corporation's fleet of vessels. The district court properly concluded that § 905(b) barred the employee from asserting a negligence claim against the corporation because it was the owner of the vessel on which the employee was injured.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the order of the district court to the extent that it dismissed the LHWCA claim. The court reversed the order to the extent that it dismissed the Jones Act claims and remanded the matter to the district court for trial.
