COURT DENIED MOTION BY PROVIDER OF MILITARY ENTITIES TO VACATE EX PARTE ORDER SERVED BY BUNKER SUPPLIER DIRECTING ATTACHMENT UNDER SUPP. R. CERTAIN ADM. & MAR. CL. B. CONTRACT FOR FURNISHING FUEL TO VESSEL QUALIFIED AS MARITIME CONTRACT SUCH THAT ADMIRALT
WILHELMSEN PREMIER MARINE FUELS AS, Plaintiff, -against- UBS PROVEDORES PTY LTD. a/k/a USS-UBS INTERNATIONAL and RAECORP INTERNATIONAL PTY LTD., Defendants.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74477
October 1, 2007, Filed
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendants, a provider of military entities including the provision of marine fuel to military vessels and its successor, moved to vacate the ex parte orders directing issuance of a Process of Maritime Attachment and Garnishment against defendants and served by plaintiff bunker supplier under Supp. R. Certain Adm. & Mar. Cl. B & E(4)(f), or, alternatively, to certify an interlocutory appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. § 1292(b).
OVERVIEW: The provider entered into a marine fuel oil requirements contract with the United States to provide bunker fuel to vessels. The provider then agreed with plaintiff wherein plaintiff would provide vessels nominated by the provider with bunkers. Plaintiff performed under the contract by ordering another to bunker the nominated vessel, but claimed that it was never paid. Plaintiff attached electronic fund transfers (EFT) to and from defendants while they passed through New York banks. Defendants claimed that the EFTs were not subject to attachment under Rule B. The court rejected the argument that the EFTs were not subject to maritime attachment. Further, the attachment was not premature because plaintiff had yet to commence an action to litigate the underlying claims. More importantly, the court held that even if it characterized plaintiff as a broker or intermediary that would not preclude it from finding maritime jurisdiction. The court explained that a contract for furnishing fuel to a vessel qualified as a maritime contract such that admiralty jurisdiction was proper, regardless of whether the fuel was provided by plaintiff directly or by a third party at plaintiff's order.
OUTCOME: The court denied defendants' motion in its entirety.
