ILLINOIS WHISTLEBLOWER ACT, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 174/20, AND THE SEAMAN'S PROTECTION ACT, 46 U.S.C.S. ¤ 2114(A)(1)(A), WERE INAPPLICABLE TO A DECKHAND'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS FIRED FOR COMPLAINING THAT BARGE CREW MEMBERS WERE USING ILLEGAL DRUGS
DAVE ROBINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALTER BARGE LINE, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 871
January 16, 2008, Decided
PROCEDURAL POSTURE Plaintiff former deckhand sued defendant barge owner in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois under the Illinois Whistleblower Act, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 174/20, the Seaman's Protection Act, 46 U.S.C.S. ¤ 2114(a)(1)(A), state common law for retaliatory discharge, and admiralty tort law. The district court granted summary judgment for the barge owner. The deckhand appealed.
OVERVIEW: The deckhand claimed that he was discharged in retaliation for having complained to management that barge crew members were using illegal drugs while on duty. The court of appeals found that the Illinois Whistleblower Act, which prohibited retaliation based on an employee's refusal to participate in an illegal activity, was inapplicable because there was no indication that the deckhand was fired because he refused to use drugs. Nor did the Seaman's Protection Act apply, as the deckhand had not reported and was not about to report the use of illegal drugs to the Coast Guard or any other federal agency when he was fired. The district court erroneously found that the deckhand's state common law retaliatory discharge claim was preempted by the Seaman's Protection Act and admiralty law. There was no indication that the Seaman's Protection Act was intended to occupy the entire field of retaliatory discharge of seamen, and the saving to suitors provision of 28 U.S.C.S. ¤ 1331(1) precluded automatic preemption of state remedies by admiralty law. The deckhand forfeited a claim that a preemptive admiralty tort existed that prohibited discharge for raising safety concerns.
OUTCOME: The district court's judgment was reversed as to the deckhand's state law retaliatory discharge claim; the judgment was otherwise affirmed. The case was remanded.
