As 33 U.S.C.S. § 905(a) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.S. § 901 et seq., preempted an employee's claim under Ohio law against his employer, alleging that the employer caused an injury through an intentional act committed
TALIK, APPELLEE, v. FEDERAL MARINE TERMINALS, INC., APPELLANT.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
2008 Ohio 937; 2008 Ohio LEXIS 556
March 13, 2008, Decided
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant employer sought review of a judgment from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County (Ohio), which reversed a trial court decision in favor of the employer. The court of appeals held that the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C.S. § 901 et seq., did not preempt appellee employee's claim against the employer, alleging employer intentional tort (EIT) based upon substantial certainty.
OVERVIEW: The employee worked as a longshoreman for the employer, and he was injured when a stack of pipes that he was loading collapsed on his leg. It was undisputed that the employee was covered by the LHWCA, and as a worker in the "twilight zone," he had the option of obtaining benefits under the LHWCA or Ohio workers' compensation because his employer participated in both programs under R.C. 4123.35 and 33 U.S.C.S. § 932(a). The employee received benefits under the Ohio workers' compensation fund. He thereafter filed his "substantial certainty" EIT action, which resulted in a grant of summary judgment to the employer based on the preemption of 33 U.S.C.S. § 905(a). The court of appeals reversed that decision, finding that there was no preemption to the EIT claim. On further review, the court noted that Congress did not expressly preempt the intentional tort standard in Ohio, based on the language of the LHWCA. However, conflict preemption applied in order to avoid inconsistency with the central purpose underlying the LHWCA of creating a uniform compensation system. Accordingly, the court concluded that the LHWCA preempted the substantial certainty EIT claim pursuant to § 905(a).
OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the matter to that court for consideration of the employee's second assignment of error.
