Under the Chandris rule, an injured worker whose job was to notify drilling rig movers of potential underwater hazards could not recover damages for negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 30104(a), because he did not spend 30 percent of his time o
STEPHEN L WILLIS; CORINNA J WILLIS, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. FUGRO CHANCE, INC, Defendant-Appellee
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 10838
May 21, 2008, Filed
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: In a diversity suit, plaintiffs, an injured worker and his wife, appeal a judgment from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granting defendant, a Louisiana corporation, summary judgment on their negligence claims under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C.S. §§ 30104-30105, commonly known as the Jones Act. After the suit was removed from state court, the district court denied the worker's motion for remand.
OVERVIEW: The worker was employed by the corporation as a survey party chief who assisted in moving vessels and other devices, such as semi-submersible drilling rigs, from dry-docks and harbors to drill site locations. Using a satellite telephone, the worker was responsible for consulting global positioning satellites, maps, and the corporation's database and notifying rig movers of potential underwater hazards. While aboard a submersible offshore drilling rig leased, owned, and crewed by parties other than the corporation, the worker was exposed to mercury and other toxic chemicals, resulting in severe damage to his brain and central nervous system. The district court found that the worker did not qualify as a "seaman" for purposes of the Jones Act, as determined under the U.S. Supreme Court's Chandris rule. The Chandris rule required that a maritime worker spend 30 percent of his time on vessels under the common ownership or control of his employer. The worker performed his job on various vessels as the need arose, none of which were owned or controlled by the corporation. Because the worker did not qualify as a seaman, he could not recover damages for negligence under 46 U.S.C.S. § 30104(a).
OUTCOME: The court affirmed.
