Cruise Ship Law

MICHAEL GRIVESMAN, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES, Defendants.

Case Number: 00 C 2091
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OFILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5257
April 26, 2001, Decided
April 27, 2001, Docketed

OUTCOME:On January 24, 2001, we dismissed this action for improper venue. We noted in footnote 6 that plaintiffs had not asked for transfer to the federal court in the Southern District of Florida. On March 15, 2001, plaintiffs belatedly did ask for transfer. Given that they are pro se, we treat the motion as one for relief from judgment for mistake or inadvertence pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We vacate the dismissal and transfer the case to the Southern District of Florida.

HEATH BUFORD VERSUS CARDINAL SERVICES, INC. AND B. T. OPERATING CO.

01-0738
COURT OF APPEAL OF LOUISIANA, THIRD CIRCUIT
01-0738 (La.App. 3 Cir, 12/12/01); 2001 La. App. LEXIS 3006
December 12, 2001, Rendered

PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL FROM THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. PARISH OF IBERIA, NO. 90,901, HONORABLE GERARD B. WATTIGNY, DISTRICT JUDGE.

DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff worker sued defendant employer under the Jones Act, specifically 46 U.S.C.S. § 688, after he suffered a work-related injury. The Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Iberia, Louisiana, granted summary judgment to the employer, and the worker appealed.

OVERVIEW: The worker performed his tasks on land, on fixed platforms, and on vessels. The employer claimed that over 55 percent of his work was done either in the shop or on a fixed platform, and that he worked on vessels only 27.30 percent of the time. The trial court found that the worker was not a Jones Act seaman. The appellate court held that issues of material fact as to the worker's seaman status precluded summary judgment. The trial judge neglected to consider his time aboard all five of the employer's vessels, and that some of the work he performed contributed to the function of these vessels. A jury could have concluded that his total work time aboard vessels owned and controlled by the employer was over 30 percent, the normal cutoff for seaman status under the Jones Act. Even a finding of less than 30 percent would not necessarily have defeated a finding of seaman status, if the jury found that his work aboard the vessels exposed him to maritime hazards. There was thus evidence from which a jury could have found that the worker met both the 30 percent requirement and the two-part test for seaman status under the Jones Act.

OUTCOME: The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for trial on the merits.

MACK ATES VERSUS MALLARD BAY DRILLING, INC.

01-0836
COURT OF APPEAL OF LOUISIANA, THIRD CIRCUIT
01-0836 (La.App. 3 Cir, 12/12/01); 2001 La. App. LEXIS 2958
December 12, 2001, Decided

PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL FROM THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF IBERIA, NUMBER 81,648, GERARD B. WATTIGNY, DISTRICT JUDGE.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Iberia (Louisiana), entered a final judgment in favor of plaintiff employee and against defendant employer, and awarded damages, after the employee sued the employer under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 688, and general maritime law for injuries the employee sustained aboard the employer's vessel on which he was working. Both parties appealed.

OVERVIEW: The employee worked for the employer as a rig mechanic. He was on light duty status with the employer while he recovered from surgery and from back pain from a previous accident. He was then assigned to a particular vessel that needed a mud pump repaired. That job required heavy manual labor, which was ordinarily part of the employee's responsibilities but for his light duty status. Nevertheless, his supervisor told him to assist with the repair. He did as he was told. The chief mechanic on the rig picked up one end of a 150-pound metal mud slide and gestured to the employee for assistance. The employee had no option but to walk backwards in a very cluttered and narrow work space. He fell and injured his back. After the employee received a judgment for his injuries and was awarded damages, the appellate court found liability was established because the vessel was unseaworthy, as the deck was cluttered and obstructed. It also found the employer was liable for making the employee do work in violation of his light duty restriction and for not providing a safe work area. It further concluded the damage award was supported by the record and should not be disturbed.

OUTCOME: The judgment was affirmed.

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT OF FRS CORPORATION, AS OWNERAND/OR OWNER PRO HAC VICE OF THE VESSEL M/V HERCULES, HER ENGINES, TACKLE,APPURTENANCE, ETC. PRAYING FOR EXONERATION FROM OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY

CIVIL ACTION NO:01-2443 SECTION: "G"(2)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21224
December 11, 2001, Decided
December 12, 2001, Filed, Entered

PRIOR HISTORY: None.

DISPOSITION: [*1] Claimant's motion to lift stay of his state court proceeding granted.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff corporation filed a limitation proceeding in connection with claimant seaman's state court civil action for injuries allegedly sustained after he fell from a vessel. The court approved the corporation's letter of undertaking, directed an issuance of notice to claimants, and restrained prosecution. The seaman moved to lift the stay and to hold the limitation proceeding in abeyance pending the resolution of his state court action.

OVERVIEW: The seaman alleged that he suffered personal injuries as a result of falling off a vessel while employed by another company. The seaman further alleged that the vessel was in an unseaworthy condition at the time of his accident, that the corporation was liable as a result of its negligence and fault, and that he was entitled to recovery as a Jones Act seaman. The corporation opposed the motion to lift the stay and asserted that the stipulations filed by the seaman in support of his motion were inadequate. The court held that the corporation did not allege that the seaman's counsel did not have authority to sign for him, and did not cite any statute or case for its contention that the stipulation should be signed by the seaman individually. The stipulations offered by the seaman adequately protected the corporation's right to seek limitation of liability in the court. The issues of "seaman" and "vessel" status could be determined by the state court and there was no requirement that these issues be resolved before the stay could be lifted.

OUTCOME: The motion to lift the stay of state court proceedings was granted.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST JONES ACT SEAMAN DENIED WHERE SEAMAN PROVIDED EXPERT MEDICAL TESTIMONY ESTABLISHING A CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN SEAMAN'S INJURIES AND INCIDENT ON THE VESSEL EVEN IN LIGHT OF EVIDENCE THAT INJURY PRE-EXISTED INCIDENT AND ALLEGATIONS THAT SEAMAN'S EXPERT MEDICAL TESTIMONY WAS BASED ON INCORRECT AND FALSE INFORMATION

DANIEL GINTHER VERSUS SEA SUPPORT SERVICES L.L.C., ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY

CIVIL ACTION No. 00-2928 SECTION "K
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21225
December 12, 2001, Decided
December 12, 2001, Filed
December 13, 2001, Entered

PRIOR HISTORY: None.

DISPOSITION: [*1] Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment DENIED.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendants, employing vessel owner and its insurer, moved for partial summary judgment on the claims of plaintiff injured seaman brought under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 688. The owner and insurer asserted that the seaman could not establish that his cervical injuries occurred during his employment because uncontroverted facts showed the injury was pre-existing.

OVERVIEW: The seaman alleged that he injured his neck on or about August 16, 2000, when he fell down stairs while going below deck to the engine room. He had surgery after the fall. However, the employer and insurer presented evidence that he had suffered a herniated cervical disk and was referred to a neurosurgeon on February 17, 2000, and before he began working for the employer. The seaman presented the expert testimony of a physician that there could be a causal connection between his injuries and his fall while employed. The owner argued that evidence should be disregarded because the medical opinion was based on incorrect and false information. The court noted the physician also stated that the seaman's condition was worsened from a compression of the nerve root to a compression of the spinal cord, and necessitated the surgery. He based his opinion on the data and the information that neurosurgeons typically rely, and raised an issue sufficient to deny summary judgment.

OUTCOME: The motion for partial summary judgment was denied, because there was an issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff's neck injuries were caused during his employment with defendant.

PETITION OF CAPE FEAR, INC., FOR EXONERATION FROM OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY, CIVIL AND MARITIME

CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-11312-REK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21904
December 20, 2001, Decided

PRIOR HISTORY: None.

DISPOSITION: [*1] Cape Fear's Petition for Exoneration DENIED.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: After the vessel sank, petitioner vessel owner petitioned the court for exoneration from or limitation of liability.

OVERVIEW: The claimants asserted that the vessel was unseaworthy at the commencement of the voyage and became more so as conditions of the vessel and the seas developed during the latter stages of taking clams aboard. The court found that as the captain started the return to port the vessel was unseaworthy because it was substantially overloaded with clams in cages, a practice that had become common on the vessel. A significant portion of the cages of clams were stacked on deck so as to place the center of gravity of the loaded vessel higher than was safe. At that time the sea had already become rough in weather that predictably would produce rougher seas en route to port. These conditions made it highly likely that the vessel would sink and that before settling to the bottom it would roll, creating a very high risk not only of loss of the vessel and cargo but as well loss of life of one or more persons among the captain and crew.

OUTCOME: The vessel owner's petition for exoneration was denied

CAPTAIN HARTMUT RATHJE, et al., Plaintiffs v. SCOTIA PRINCECRUISES, LTD., Defendant

Civil No. 01-123-P-DMC
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21266
December 20, 2001, Decided

PRIOR HISTORY: None.

DISPOSITION: [*1] Defendant's motion granted as to plaintiffs' claim pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. § 626, and otherwise denied.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiffs, former foreign employees, worked on a ship for defendant, foreign employer. Plaintiffs brought two claims against their former employer: breach of employment contract (specifically, wrongful termination) and violation of a Maine wage statute, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, § 626. Defendant moved for summary judgment.

OVERVIEW: The employer sought summary judgment as to the first claim on the basis that the employees were not terminated, but rather resigned. The employer specifically argued that the employees' ultimatum constituted a resignation and that its refusal to accede to that ultimatum did not convert their resignations into discharges. In the employer's view, it possessed a unilateral right to waive the notice period, which it did. Thus, the employees had no right to receive compensation for their respective notice periods. The employees countered that, rather than resigning, they were effectively terminated. The court held that employees adduced sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they resigned. With respect to the Maine wage statute, the employees asked the court to employ an eight-factor choice-of-law test designed to ferret out the state with the most significant contacts to a given claim. The employer argued that the most-significant-contacts test was inapplicable to a wage claim. In the employer's view, the "law of the flag" doctrine governed, and the presumption against extraterritorial application of state statutes applied. The court agreed.

OUTCOME: The employer's motion for summary judgment was granted as to the plaintiffs' state law claim for wages, but was otherwise denied.

DEBRA WARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CROSS SOUND FERRY, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 01-7502
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
273 F.3d 520; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 26345
November 2, 2001, Argued
December 10, 2001, Decided

PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] Plaintiff-appellant Debra Ward appeals from the March 29, 2001 judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Denis R. Hurley, District Judge) granting summary judgment to defendant-appellee Cross Sound Ferry and dismissing Ward's complaint as time-barred.

DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff injured passenger sued defendant ferry operator for personal injuries from a slip and fall on the gangway as she was boarding the operator's boat. The passenger appealed from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granting summary judgment to the operator and dismissing the complaint as time-barred.

OVERVIEW: The operator sought to enforce a contractual time limitation appearing on the back of the passage ticket that required suits to be filed within one year of an injury. The passenger's husband obtained her ticket just two to three minutes before boarding the ferry. On boarding, the operator collected the tickets. The operator did not dispute that it typically issued tickets just prior to boarding and collected them upon boarding. The court of appeals found that possession of the ticket for such a short period of time was insufficient to give the passenger reasonable notice that the ticket contained important contractual limitations. Indeed, the fact that the operator collected the tickets so quickly after providing them to the passenger tended to negate the idea that the tickets were important contractual documents. The district court improperly (1) confused the question of reasonable communication with the less important question whether it was possible to read the ticket in the time provided, and (2) shifted the burden to the passenger to learn, after the fact, if notice had been given, rather than determining whether the operator had given reasonable notice in the first place.

OUTCOME: The court of appeals reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the operator, and remanded for further proceedings.

EMPLOYEE WHO HAD WORKED FOR EMPLOYER FOR SEVERAL YEARS AS SEAMAN BUT WHO WAS TRANSFERED TO STATIONARY BARGE PERFORMING A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF NONSEAMAN'S WORK MAY BE PROTECTED BY THE MAXIMUM HOUR AND OVERTIME PROVISIONS OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT WHICH EXEMPTS SEAMEN

BOBBY OWENS, on behalf of himself and all other employees of Sea River Maritime, Inc., similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus SEARIVER MARITIME, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 00-60048
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
272 F.3d 698; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 23908; 7 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 732
November 6, 2001, Decided

PRIOR HISTORY: Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. 1:98-CV-436-BrR. David C Bramlette, III, US District Judge.

DISPOSITION: REVERSED and REMANDED.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff employee sued defendant employer pursuant to the maximum hour and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C.S. § 201 et seq. The employee appealed the grant, by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, of the employer's motion for summary judgment based on the employee's exemption from the FLSA as a seaman.

OVERVIEW: The employee had worked several years for the employer as a seaman. However, he was transferred to a "strike team" assigned to a stationary barge. The team performed work usually done by towboat crews, including loading and unloading product, but worked on unattended barges that were neither towed by the employer's boats nor attended by its crews. The employee attended the barges only for the purposes of loading and unloading product. The court of appeals disagreed with the district court's ruling that the employee was a seaman for purposes of the FLSA and thereby exempt from its overtime provisions. The court found that the employee performed a substantial amount of nonseaman's work, that is, loading and unloading petroleum product, which was the primary purpose of his employment, and the activity to which the employee devoted the most substantial portion of his working time. This activity only prepared vessels for navigation; it did not aid in its actual operation as a means of transportation.

OUTCOME: The court of appeals reversed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment for the employer, and remanded for further proceedings.

In re: the EXXON VALDEZ, GRANT BAKER, et al., as representatives of the Mandatory Punitive Damages Class, Plaintiffs-Appellees,v. JOSEPH HAZELWOOD, Defendant, and EXXON CORPORATION; EXXON SHIPPING COMPANY,Defendants-Appellants. In re: the EXXON VALDEZ, GRANT BAKER, et al., as representatives of the Mandatory Punitive Damages Class, Plaintiffs-Appellees,v. EXXON CORPORATION; EXXON SHIPPING COMPANY, Defendants, and JOSEPH HAZELWOOD,Defendant-Appellant. DANIEL R. CALHOUN; BRADFORD J. CHISHOLM; DAVID P. CLARKE;THOMAS S. MCALLISTER; PHILLIP G. MCCRUDDEN; MICHAEL J. MCCLENAGHAN; GUY PIERCEY;HUGH WISNER; GRANT C. BAKER; LARRY L. DOOLEY; KIM J. EWERS; JOHN W. HERSCHLEB;KENT HERSCHLEB; DAVID B. HORNE; MICHAEL J. OWECKE; GERALD E. THORNE; GEORGE A.GORDAOFF; OLD HARBOR NATIVE CORPORATION; TIMBERLINE, INC.; BARBARA BROWN; JOHNFOGES; JAMIE L. HALLADAY; CHARLES MCMAHON; JENNIFER BRIGGS; TERRI MAST; MARK T.COLES; FRED GALICANO; MIKE HOLLERBEKE; KATHY BRYAN; VINCENT LIBED; ARTHUDDLESTON; ROBERT LOVE; ROXANE VILLAUEVA; MARCELO ROMBAOA; SCOTT HULBERT; BRIANGILLIS; FRANK MICHAEL CARLSON; ELENOR MCMULLEN; NATIVE VILLAGE OF LARSEN BAY;NATIVE VILLAGE OF CHENEGA BAY, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. EXXON CORPORATION;EXXON SHIPPING COMPANY; JOSEPH HAZELWOOD, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-35191, No. 97-35192, Nos. 97-35193, 97-35235
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
270 F.3d 1215; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 24029; 2001 Cal. DailyOp. Service 9528; 2001 Daily Journal DAR 11915
May 3, 1999, Argued and Submitted, Seattle, Washington
November 7, 2001, Filed

PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska. D.C. No. CV-89-00085-HRH, D.C. No. CV-89-00095-HRH. H. Russell Holland, District Judge, Presiding.

DISPOSITION: $5 billion punitive damages award was vacated and case was remanded to determine lower award in light of standards recently established by the United States Supreme Court. Summary judgment was affirmed in part but reversed as to specific classes of plaintiffs and remanded for latter group to establish allowable damages.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant corporation and plaintiff class cross-appealed from the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, entering a punitive damage award against the corporation in the class' action alleging damage to economic expectations for state commercial fishermen due to an oil spill by the corporation.

OVERVIEW: The corporation claimed that the punitive damage award was barred as against public policy, that the punitive damage award was barred by res judicata, that common law punitive damages remedy was preempted by the remedies in the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.S. §§ 1251-1387, that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to award punitive damages, and that the punitive damage award was unconstitutionally excessive. The class claimed that the district court erroneously granted summary judgment against the claimants who suffered purely economic injury on account of the oil spill. The appellate court held that, although there was substantial evidence to support the jury verdict and damage awards, the district court failed to review the constitutionality of the punitive damage award under the appropriate standards. The court concluded that the punitive damage award was too high for its required review without the district court's initial review. The court further held that the district court should have determined whether certain claimants could recover purely economic damages due to the oil spill.

OUTCOME: The judgment was vacated in part and remanded regarding whether the punitive damage award was unconstitutionally excessive, and whether certain claimants could recover purely economic damages due to the oil spill. The judgment was affirmed in part regarding the remaining claims.

FRANCINE PICKETT, BRIAN COHEN, JACK MASIN, BELLE MASIN, individually and on Behalf of all other similarly situated, Respondents, LEONARD BEBCHICK, Respondent, JOSEPH HESS, LEONA HESS, TOM CRAGO, and LINDA CRAGO, Intervenors, v. HOLLAND AMERICA LINE-- WESTOURS, INC., Petitioner.

NO. 70300-1
SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON
35 P.3d 351; 2001 Wash. LEXIS 758
May 17, 2001, Argued
November 29, 2001, Filed

PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] Appeal from Superior Court, King County; 96-2-10831-6. Honorable Jay White, Judge.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Respondents class representatives sued petitioner cruise line to recover a portion of port charges charged to them in addition to cruise fares. Intervenor objecting class member objected to the proposed settlement that was approved by the trial court. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the approval of the proposed settlement. The cruise line appealed.

OVERVIEW: The class representatives sued the cruise line for consumer protection violations and other claims. The trial court conditionally certified the class for the settlement. One member of the class objected to the trial court's approval of the settlement. The state supreme court held that the appellate court erred by focusing on the initial denial of class certification rather than determining if the settlement was fair, adequate, and reasonable. The factors used to make that determination include: plaintiffs' likelihood of success; the amount of discovery; the settlement terms; recommendation and experience of counsel; future expense and duration of litigation; recommendation of neutral parties; number of objectors and nature of objections; and the presence of good faith and the absence of collusion. The court considered that there was only one objection to the settlement out of a class of 450,000, the class was facing great uncertainty if the settlement was not approved, the travel vouchers received in the settlement were redeemable if not used, the parties were represented by good counsel, and the presence of good faith to hold the settlement was fair, adequate, and reasonable. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, members of the class were to receive fully transferable travel vouchers, redeemable for future Holland cruises. They are valid for three years from the date of issuance. The voucher amounts vary, depending upon the length of the original cruise and the date of its departure. The amounts are as follows:

Years of Departure Duration of Cruise Voucher Amount: 1992-94: Under 14 Days = $10.00; 14-21 Days = $15.00; Over 21 Days = $20.00; 1995-96: Under 14 Days = $25.00; 14-21 Days = $37.50; Over 21 Days = $50.00. The principal restriction on use of the vouchers is that they must be used for a booking made within 45 days of departure.

OUTCOME: The Court of Appeals was reversed the class settlement was determined to be fair, adequate, and reasonable

LINDA KAY WELCH, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TUTRIX FOR DAYLON CHASEBOSWELL AND KYLER WELCH AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF BYRON JOSEPH BOSWELLAND LISA PERIERA, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TUTRIX FOR BRANDON BOSWELL AND AS PERSONALREPRESENTATIVE OF BYRON JOSEPH BOSWELL VERSUS FUGRO GEOSCIENCES, INC., AND ITSINSURER SIGNAL MUTUAL INDEMNITY ASSOCIATION, LTD.; MARSHLAND MARINE OF BAYTOWN,TEXAS, AND ITS INSURER XYZ INSURANCE COMPANY

2000 CA 1231
COURT OF APPEAL OF LOUISIANA, FIRST CIRCUIT
2000 1231 (La.App. 1 Cir, 11/21/01); 2001 La. App. LEXIS 2716
November 21, 2001, Rendered

PRIOR HISTORY: On appeal from the eighteenth judicial district court. (number 25,579), parish of West Baton Rouge, state of louisiana. Honorable Jack T. Marionneaux, judge.

DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED. Costs are assessed against the plaintiffs-appellants.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant, a deceased longshoreman's minor child, sued appellees, employer and insurer, asserting claims under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.S. § 688, under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1333, and under state law. The Eighteenth Judicial District Court of West Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana, granted partial summary judgment to the employer and insurer, and dismissed the child's claims for consortium, punitive, and other nonpecuniary damages. The child appealed.

OVERVIEW: The child's father, working on his employer's airboat, died in Louisiana territorial waters after the airboat sank. The child alleged that the employer was negligent, and violated its warranty of seaworthiness to the decedent. In granting partial summary judgment to the employer and its insurer, the trial court held that nonpecuniary damages could not be recovered for the death of a longshoreman injured in territorial waters. The appellate court agreed. It assumed for purposes of the opinion that the parties had stipulated that the decedent had been a longshoreman. 33 U.S.C.S. § 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act barred any recovery from shipowners for the death of a longshoreman resulting from breach of the duty of seaworthiness. A dependent of a longshoreman injured on the outer continental shelf could not recover loss of consortium damages under the general maritime law. The fact that La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315.3 authorized punitive damages was immaterial, as the statute was inapplicable, having been preempted by federal maritime law.

OUTCOME: The judgment was affirmed.